INDEX

to

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Volume 40

Number 1 (March 1996) 1-216
Number 2 (June 1996) 217-392
Number 3 (September 1996) 393-520
Number 4 (December 1996) 521-704

Authors:

BASCOM, JOHNATHAN B., see Zeager, L. A.

BENOIT, KENNETH, "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," 636.

BORNSTEIN, GARY, DANNY MINGELGRIN, and CHRISTEL RUTTE, "The Effects of Within-Group Communication on Group Decision and Individual Choice in the Assurance and Chicken Team Games," 486.

BOTTOM, WILLIAM P., CHERYL L. EAVEY, and GARY J. MILLER, "Getting to the Core: Coalitional Integrity as a Constraint on the Power of Agenda Setters," 298.

BRITO, DAGOBERT L., and MICHAEL D. INTRILIGATOR, "Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem," 206.

BRUSH, STEPHEN G., "Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence," 523.

CRICHLOW, SCOTT, see Schafer, M.

EAVEY, CHERYL L., see Bottom, W. P.

EYERMAN, JOE, and ROBERT A. HART, JR., "An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracies Speak Louder than Words," 597.

FETT, PATRICK J., see Mason, T. D.

FROHLICH, NORMAN, and JOE OPPENHEIMER, "When Is Universal Contribution Best for the Group? Characterizing Optimality in the Prisoners' Dilemma," 502.

GARTNER, SCOTT SIGMUND, and RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON, "War Expansion and War Outcome," 4.

GARTZKE, ERIK, see Simon, M. W.

HARIK, JUDITH PALMER, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," 41.

HART, ROBERT A., JR., see Eyerman, J.

HENAGER, ROBERT F., see Parks, C. D.

HERMANN, MARGARET G., and CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR., "Ballots, a Barrier against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention," 436.

INTRILIGATOR, MICHAEL D., see Brito, D. L.

KEGLEY, CHARLES W., JR., see Hermann, M. G.

KLEIBOER, MARIEKE, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 360.

LANGLOIS, CATHERINE C., and JEAN-PIERRE P. LANGLOIS, "Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study," 569.

LANGLOIS, JEAN-PIERRE P., see Langlois, C. C.

MANDELL, BRIAN S., "Getting to Peacekeeping in Principal Rivalries: Anticipating an Israel-Syria Peace Treaty," 238.
MASON, T. DAVID, and PATRICK J. FETT, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," 546.
MILLER, GARY J., see Bottom, W. P.
MINGELGRIN, DANNY, see Bornstein, G.
O'BRIEN, SEAN P., "Foreign Policy Crises and the Resort to Terrorism: A Time-Series Analysis of Conflict Linkages," 320.
O'NEILL, BARRY, "Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council," 219
OPPENHEIMER, JOE, see Frohlich, N.
PARKS, CRAIG D., ROBERT F. HENAGER, and SHAWN D. SCAMAHORN, "Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas," 134.
POLZER, JEFFREY T., "Intergroup Negotiations: The Effects of Negotiating Teams," 678.
REGAN, PATRICK M., "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," 336.
RUTTE, CHRISTEL, see Bornstein, G.
SCAMAHORN, SHAWN D., see Parks, C. D.
SCHAFER, MARK, and SCOTT CRICHLOW, "Antecedents of Groupthink: A Quantitative Study," 415.
SCHOCK, KURT, "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," 98.
SIGNORINO, CURTIS S., "Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty: The Effects of Symmetric and Asymmetric Noise," 152.
SIMON, MARC V., and HARVEY STARR, "Extraction, Allocation, and the Rise and Decline of States: A Simulation Analysis of Two-Level Security Management," 272.
SIMON, MICHAEL W., and ERIK GARTZKE, "Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?" 617.
SIVERSON, RANDOLPH M., see Gartner, S. S.
SMITH, ALASTAIR, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision," 16.
SOROKIN, GERALD L., "The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions," 658.
STARR, HARVEY, see Simon, M. V.
WANG, KEVIN H., "Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics," 68.
YOUNG, MICHAEL D., "Cognitive Mapping Meets Semantic Networks," 395.
ZEAGER, LESTER A., and JOHNATHAN B. BASCOM, "Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," 460.

Articles:

"Antecedents of Groupthink: A Quantitative Study," Schafer and Crichlow, 415.
"Ballots, a Barrier against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention," Hermann and Kegley, 436.
"Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," Harik, 41.
"Cognitive Mapping Meets Semantic Networks," Young, 395.
"Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," Regan, 336.
"A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," Schock, 98.
"Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Benoit, 636.
"Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence," Brush, 523.
"The Effects of Within-Group Communication on Group Decision and Individual Choice in the Assurance and Chicken Team Games," Bornstein et al., 486.
"An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracies Speak Louder than Words," Eyerman and Hart, 597.

"Extraction, Allocation, and the Rise and Decline of States: A Simulation Analysis of Two-Level Security Management," Simon and Starr, 272.
"Foreign Policy Crises and the Resort to Terrorism: A Time-Series Analysis of Conflict Linkages," O'Brien, 320.
"Getting to the Core: Coalitional Integrity as a Constraint on the Power of Agenda Setters," Bottom et al., 298.
"Getting to Peacekeeping in Principal Rivalries: Anticipating an Israel-Syria Peace Treaty," Mandell, 238.
"How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Mason and Fett, 546.
"Intergroup Negotiations: The Effects of Negotiating Teams," Polzer, 678.
"Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?" Simon and Gartzke, 617.
"Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council," O'Neill, 219
"Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics," Wang, 68.
"Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem," Brito and Intriligator, 206.
"The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions," Sorokin, 658.
"Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty: The Effects of Symmetric and Asymmetric Noise," Signorino, 152.
"Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Zeager and Bascom, 460.
"Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study," Langlois and Langlois, 569.
"To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision," Smith, 16.
"Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas," Parks et al., 134.
"Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Kleiboer, 360.
"War Expansion and War Outcome," Gartner and Siverson, 4.
"When Is Universal Contribution Best for the Group? Characterizing Optimality in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 502.